This paper characterizes the monetary policy in Brazil through a forward-looking Taylor-rule-type reaction function before and after the Real plan, which stabilized inflation in July 1994. The results show that the interest rate response to inflation was greater than one-to-one before stabilization and smaller than that afterwards, hence inverting the Taylor's principle. Several robustness checks, using mainly distinct proxies for output, output gap and data frequency strongly confirm the findings. 
Introduction
This paper characterizes the monetary policy in Brazil through a forward-looking Taylor-rule-type reaction function before and after the Real plan, which stabilized in ‡ation in July 1994. The results show that the interest rate response to in ‡ation was greater than one-to-one before stabilization and smaller than that afterwards, hence inverting the Taylor's principle. Several robustness checks, using mainly distinct proxies for output, output gap and data frequency strongly con…rm the …ndings.
For ease of exposition and motivational purposes, I divide the recent Brazilian monetary history into three periods 1 , all of them shadowed accordingly in Figure 1 .
The …rst period goes from January 1980 to June 1994 and is labeled Megain ‡ationary Era, 2 when (log) in ‡ation peaked almost 500% per year 3 in the …rst quarter of 1990.
The …gure also shows labels of other attempts that failed to beat in ‡ation. The The importance of analyzing Brazil rests on the inarguable monetary instability 1 Bueno (2006) …nds roughly the same subdivision using a Markov Switching Model, in which the states are endogenously determined. 2 All contracts were indexed to a price index, in such a way that the purchasing power decreased relatively slowly. That arrangement dates back to the early 1960s and held in ‡ation very high for a long time. That is why it was not a typical hyperin ‡ation. 3 The …gure corresponds to an e¤ective in ‡ation of almost 12; 600% per year. The Taylor rule characterizes monetary instability 4 as an interest rate that responds to in ‡ation in a smaller than one-to-one basis, whereas monetary stability means a response to in ‡ation in a magnitude greater than one-to-one (see Woodford, 2003, ch. 4) . This claim is known as the Taylor's principle and expresses a simple idea 5 : if in ‡ation increases, the nominal interest rate must grow faster in order to make the real interest rate rise, so as to push consumption and investment down and thereby inhibit in ‡ationary tendencies. We shall see, however, that the Taylor's principle applied in Brazil during the Megain ‡ationary Era did not work out. In addition, the interest rate response to in ‡ation in the Real Era was smaller than one-to-one, but monetary instability did not return as in all other past attempts.
The results are con…rmed statistically by Wald tests. A …rst corollary is that monetary policymakers did look ahead trying to stabilize in ‡ation before 1994, instead of the backward-looking argument in Brazil that rests on the fact that contracts were indexed to past in ‡ation. Another corollary is that the in ‡ation coe¢ cient does not need to be greater than one to characterize monetary stability, that is, an in ‡ation coe¢ cient greater than one may not stabilize price growth. Bueno (2008) reaches a similar conclusion for the U.S. by enabling the in ‡ation coe¢ cient to ‡uctuate over time using the Kalman …lter. Blinder and Reis (2005) also …nd an in ‡ation coe¢ cient less than one during Greenspan's chairmanship. Cochrane (2007) argues that in ‡ation determination demands elements beyond an interest rate response that follows the Taylor's principle.
In the third period, the interest rate responds to in ‡ation deviation from the target announced in advance. That means a change in the reaction function, as in ‡ation target deviation replaces in ‡ation. In that case, all coe¢ cients are very close to Favero and Giavazzi's (2002) and Minella's (2002) .
I estimate all rules using the generalized method of moments, GMM, by Hansen (1982) . Particularly in the third period, the interest rate response is greater than oneto-one when observed expectations are on the right hand side. Nevertheless, Wald tests fail to reject that the in ‡ation coe¢ cient is equal to one. Minella et alli (2003) estimate the model by ordinary least squares and …nd an in ‡ation parameter larger than two, probably because of some endogeneity in their model 6 . Alternatively, I
estimate another model through which I show that monetary policymakers follow a rule with current in ‡ation on the right hand side, in such a way that its corresponding parameter continues to be smaller than one-to-one. Empirically both models are equally plausible descriptions of the monetary policy. Consequently, we can see again stable in ‡ation associated with an accommodative monetary policy.
The paper is organized as follows. The basic econometric model is discussed in Section 2. The data used in the paper and the construction of the variables are in Section 3. The empirical strategy and the analysis of the results are in Section 4, which is divided into three subsections, according to the periods de…ned previously.
I also present part of the robustness checks there, and relegate the remaining checks to the appendix. The last section concludes. 6 The target in July 2002 was adjusted to match up with the growing market expectations on in ‡ation. The interest rate increased, too. Therefore, the reaction to in ‡ation target deviation also increased, since in ‡ation deviation shrank.
The Model
I follow Clarida, Galí and Gertler (2000) to set up the model. I assume that the central bank de…nes a target rate given by:
where i t is the target interest rate followed by the Central Bank at time t;
r is the long-run equilibrium real rate;
is long-run target for in ‡ation; i (r + ) is the desired nominal rate when both in ‡ation and output are at their target levels;
is the expectation taken with respect to the information set, t , available at t; t;k is the in ‡ation rate between periods t and t + k;
t is the in ‡ation target at time t; x t;q is the output gap between the beginning of t and the beginning of t + q.
The information set from the econometrician's standpoint corresponds to dating of expectations not being observed in real time. Therefore, following Jondeau, Bihan and Gallès (2004) I de…ne t 1 = i t 1 ; t 1 ; x t 1 ; t 1 ; : : : . 7 Equation (1) nests other plausible models, provided that either in ‡ation (lagged) or a linear combination of in ‡ation and output gap is a su¢ cient statistic for predicting future in ‡ation. For example, Taylor (1993) proposes a rule with lagged in ‡ation and output. Rudebusch and Svensson (1999) set up a model where current in ‡ation 7 The information set in CGG is the same, but they set it as t . and output gap enter the rule and report a high R 2 , however in their model the information set includes current variables.
Smoothing the Interest Rate
Equation (1) 
where g i 2 [0; 1) indicates the degree of smoothing of the interest rate changes;
t is a zero-mean, homokedastic, non autocorrelated, exogenous shock on the interest rate.
The shock t allows for a bit of reality. It is impossible to avoid some degree of randomness in policy actions associated with misforecasts of the economy. Moreover, the central bank does not succeed perfectly in keeping interest rate at the desired level through open market operations, as equation (1) Combining the partial adjustment equation (2) with the target model (1) and rearranging, one obtains the policy reaction function that will interest us during both the Megain ‡ationary and Real eras, where I enforce that t = :
where
Apart from t , the term " t follows, by construction, a moving average process of order max (k; q) 1, thereby it will be serially correlated except when k = q = 1. In the most part of this paper, I assume k = q = 1. Thus, let us see the properties of " t in that case. First, for ease of notation de…ne
and observe that
Hence:
We still can have autocorrelation in " t , however. To see that, consider what happens between t and t + 1:
The …rst term is zero because t is not autocorrelated by assumption. The last term is zero because f t+1 and f t+2 are expectational errors, so as they belong to mutually independent sets. The third term is zero because:
The …rst equality comes from the Law of Iterated Expectations and the result follows. Notwithstanding, we cannot disregard the possibility that E t 1 ( t+1 f t+1 ) 6 = 0, since both factors belong to the same information set. There is no reasonable motive to make E t 1 ( t+1 f t+1 ) = 0.
The term " t contains a linear combination of forecast errors and exogenous shocks, thus any vector of instruments z t 1 2 t 1 is orthogonal to the information set when i t is determined:
Equation (3) will be the main model to be explored in this article. It will be estimated using the GMM with an optimal weighting matrix to account for possible serial correlation in f" t g.
Since there is some interest in knowing the target in ‡ation , once again I follow Clarida, Galí and Gertler (2000) and impose one more restriction. I assume the equilibrium real rate r to be the observed sample average and introduce such restriction directly into equations (4) and (3), in order to identify .
In the In ‡ation Target Era, the rule changes a bit, because one can observe expectation of in ‡ation for the next twelve months. That is the rule becomes:
where mkt t;k is the market's expected in ‡ation between periods t and t + k. So, I de…ne the in ‡ation deviation from the target as d t;k = m t;k t . 8 Therefore,
I shall estimate the following rule:
Notice now that I do not make any simpli…cation regarding the in ‡ation target
, which is similar to what we have seen before.
Exchange Rates and Reserves
Since Brazil is a small open economy, Ball (1999) would include the exchange rate in the rule by arguing that a Taylor rule would perform poorly without such a variable. Taylor (2001) , however, does not share the same conviction and argues exactly the opposite. He claims that the use of exchange rate in a forward-looking reaction function is needless, because there is an indirect e¤ect of exchange rates on interest rates through in ‡ation. In other words, even if the central bank followed a policy rule disregarding a direct exchange rate e¤ect, in ‡ation would transmit such an e¤ect over time. Accordingly, Svensson (2000) shows that the exchange rate makes in ‡ation volatility undesirably high.
Exchange rate was …xed daily by the central bank in Brazil until 1999; that is, it was an almost ‡exible rate. Under that regime, if there was an external disequilibrium, the reserves would be quickly depleted, as happened in the Asian and Russian 8 Later, I show how to calculate d t;k in details.
crises in November 1997 and September 1998, respectively. Because these variables belong to the information set of policymakers by the time they set the interest rate, I include them as instruments in the GMM estimation 9 .
3 Data
Variables
Although the usual data frequency in the literature is quarterly, monthly data will be necessary mostly after the Real plan, because there are very few quarterly observations between 1994:3 and 1998:4 and even during the in ‡ation target period.
Gross domestic product (GDP), industrial production index (IND) and total consumption of electric power in gigawatts/hour (GWh) are the proxies for output, The series experienced some abrupt events that made them considerably diverse between each other. First, when the exchange rate regime became ‡oating in January 1999, there was an expressive currency depreciation, causing monthly GDP to 9 Both in log di¤erences. 10 Table 1 shows that yearly growth correlations between these variables on a monthly basis are really low 11 . That analysis is important because the outcomes will be stronger if they remain qualitatively unchanged to variations in output proxies and data frequency.
The IPCA consumer price index is the government's o¢ cial in ‡ation rate and it is used as the basis for monetary policy and in ‡ation targeting. The in ‡ation series 11 Growth correlation between GDP and GWh on a quarterly basis is 0:97. GDP: Gross domestic product; GWh: Consumption of electric power in gigawatt/hour; IND: Industrial production index; log-di¤erence between t and t 12.
was split into two parts and then each sample was seasonally adjusted by the X-12 with other variables of equal frequency. 12 For example, let i t be the interest rate in month t. Then, the interest rate corresponding to quarter 3t is:
In the instrument set, I include lags of output gap, in ‡ation, interest rate, in ‡ation target deviations, exchange rate and reserves. Appendix A contains more detailed statistics of the variables used in this paper.
Output Gap
It is the combination between output gap and in ‡ation that determines the size of the rule coe¢ cients. Hence, di¤erent methods for obtaining the output gap may yield di¤erent coe¢ cients. In view of this criticism and with the goal of checking the model robustness in Brazil, I employ two alternative but usual ways of extracting output gap from output: linear and quadratic detrend. Notwithstanding, I estimate the output gap at t using only data available up to period t, as a way to mitigate 13 the criticism raised by Orphanides and Norden (2002) , who argue that most studies employ data available later 14 than date t. Therefore, I de…ne the potential output, q n t , as a deterministic trend:
The subindex on , and stresses the fact that these coe¢ cients are estimated by ordinary least squares with a sample of t observations. Then, the output gap,
x t , will represent the residual of a rolling-over regression of the observed output, q t , against the potential output at each time:
x t = q t b q n t ; t = 1; 2; : : : ; T:
where b q n t = b t + b t t + b t t 2 stands for the estimated potential output at time t:
Despite the fact x t is an estimated variable and thus the standard-deviation of its coe¢ cient in the Taylor rule should take that into account, I shall consider it 13 Real data are hardly available in Brazil. 14 Extracting the output gap through Hodrick-Prescott …lter is an example of using data available later than t.
as observed in accordance with many authors like CGG, Blinder and Reis (2005), Taylor (1999) , among others. Figure 3 shows the output gaps resulting from the procedures just discussed. 
In ‡ation Target Era
The in ‡ation target regime started a few months before 2000 and has been the focus of many Brazilian researchers since then. Thereby, this work would be incom-
plete if I did not analyze it, although it is unnecessary to establish the main point.
The procedures lead to numbers similar to the ones obtained by other articles and,
to some extent as we shall see in the next section, they are consistent with the results presented in the preceding subsamples. Hence, the expected in ‡ation deviation from the target at period t, d t;k , is simply:
t : Figure 4 depicts the dynamics of the market's expected in ‡ation, in ‡ation target 15 Brazilian Central Bank started to collect market expectations for the next twelve months only in 2001. I take the weighted average of the medians for three reasons. First, to be consistent with the calculations of the target in ‡ation. Second, Minella et alli (2002) and Favero and Giavazzi (2002) adopt an alternative strategy. They make a weighted average like me until 2001, and then, they merge the so constructed series with the market expectations for the next twelve months series. Since the numbers are quite close to theirs as we shall see, my procedure must be empirically innocuous. Third, to be internally consistent in order to avoid either mixing two di¤erent series or using a shorter sample in the In ‡ation Target Era. and the discrepancy stemming from them. The spike in 2002 is due to the presidential race. We can notice the market's expectations increasing in advance to the in ‡ation target. That is, the target for in ‡ation is adjusting itself to expectations 16 . 
Empirical Strategy and Results
I set out data into three main periods as mentioned in the Introduction. Although economic arguments should be enough to justify such split, a numerical motivation also helps see the big picture. For that purpose, Table 2 shows the standard deviation of in ‡ation and of output in each subsample 17 . It seems quite obvious that in ‡ation volatility decreases enormously over time, although it is still high compared with the U.S., where it is about 1:6% (see Bueno, 2008 ). 16 Granger tests indicate causality in either direction both between the market's expected in ‡ation and in ‡ation target and between the market's expected in ‡ation and in ‡ation itself. 17 The year 1999 is excluded from the sample for reasons that will become clear later. Including it, however, would not change the conclusions here. The output gap volatility, measured in GWh (quadratic detrend), is diminishing and comparable with that of the U.S. The most recent increase is due to the shortage of electric power, as pointed out in Figure 2 .
The …gures delineate three very distinct monetary periods in Brazil, which practically match up with Bueno's (2006) …ndings. However, he determines these subperiods endogenously through a Markov switching model with three states.
From now on, I will proceed with the empirical estimations in each period 18 .
With the aim of testing the robustness of the results, there are eight possible Taylor rule estimates in each of them, depending on the variable used as output gap. The output gap, in turn, depends on the data frequency, on the output proxy, and on the potential output scheme. For quarterly data, the proxies for output are GDP and GWh. For monthly data, the proxies for output are GDP, GWh and IND. Output gaps based on GWh (monthly and quarterly) and monthly GDP are both extracted from linear detrend and from quadratic detrend, so there are six possibilities. The output gap is exclusively obtained from linear detrend in the cases of quarterly GDP and (monthly) IND, because the parameter of t 2 is statistically nonsigni…cant, so there are two possibilities. Besides, I make two other robustness checks with the last 18 The models were estimated using quadratic kernel, Andrews bandwidth selection and prewhitening. Some of them, however, turned out to be unfeasible under such speci…cation. In those cases, I have switched the option to Bartlett kernel and/or …xed Newey-West bandwidth, in that order. The maximum number of iterations is 5000, and only one did not converge. The program contains more details and is available upon request.
sample based on distinct rule speci…cations, in a total of 24 sets of estimates.
In the main text I compare the results using two di¤erent output gaps of each frequency. For quarterly data, I pick up the output gaps extracted using linear detrend from GDP and quadratic detrend from GWh. For monthly data, I take the output gaps extracted using a quadratic detrend from both GDP and GWh.
Appendices C to E contain the outcomes with the remaining possibilities, but the conclusions remain unchanged.
Megain ‡ationary Era
For convenience, I repeat the model estimated in this section by using GMM:
I restrict the real interest rate r to be the average di¤erence between ex post nominal interest rate and in ‡ation. The rates are identical regardless the data frequency, except in here, since monthly and quarterly date encompass distinct samples.
The quarterly real interest rate is 20:9% per year and the monthly real interest rate is 13:8% per year. 19 In order to obtain the "desired"nominal rate when both in ‡ation and output are at their target levels, so to speak since in ‡ation was uncontrolled, one should simply sum up r and the reported in the tables. Table 3 shows the Taylor rule estimations using di¤erent calculations for output gap. Following the approach of CGG, (k; q) = (1; 1). Although there was no explicit in ‡ation target during the Megain ‡ationary Era, the models seem to agree on a very high , around 120%. Considering the in ‡ation volatility at that time, such a picture comes at no surprise. The "target in ‡ation" is very high, but the average in ‡ation in that period was about 175%. Occasionally, depending on the output gap proxy, residual tests may show some autocorrelation in monthly data (not in quarterly), but they never support nonstationarity. 
0:745 0:711 0:872 0:592 (*),(**),(***) signi…cant at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. Standard deviations are in brackets. Estimated by GMM: i t = g i i t 1 + (1 g i ) [(r (g 1) ) + g t;k + g x x t;q ] + " t . GDP: Gross domestic oroduct; GWh: Consumption of electric power in GWh. Instruments include: lags 1 to 4 of interest rate, in ‡ation, exchange rate variation, reserves variation, and output gap.
The coe¢ cients g x are all negative and tend to be nonsigni…cant in quarterly data. Also they are large in absolute value, due to the remarkable di¤erence between the interest rate level compared to output gap level. The size of the coe¢ cients di¤ers across output gap proxies, but not quite across output proxies. A negative coe¢ cient is counterintuitive at …rst. But if we look at Figure 3 and see the great deal of recession during the 1980s, coupled with high in ‡ation, perhaps it makes sense and explains the negative sign of g x . Policymakers were increasing the interest rate, even in recession, to combat in ‡ation.
The smooth parameter g i is similar across all models, normalizing for data frequency, since 0:8 3 ' 0:5. The pattern is alike even if we consider distinct subsamples, since monthly data start 10 years after quarterly data.
The in ‡ation parameter g is the main point of analysis. It is greater than one in magnitude and around 1:5 across output proxies. The claim is statistically con…rmed by Wald tests. In terms of economic policy, a coe¢ cient above one means that monetary policymakers were looking ahead trying to stabilize in ‡ation before 1994, apparently contradicting conventional wisdom in Brazil that policymakers only looked backwards 20 . Moreover, the …nding implies that an in ‡ation coe¢ cient greater than one does not necessarily characterize monetary stability.
Real Era
The same model estimated in the last section is used here. The average annual real interest rate r was 19:5%. Table 4 reports the Taylor rule estimates using dissimilar calculations of output gap in the Real Era. The general conclusions, mainly on the in ‡ation parameter g , are similar in either frequency, although the number of observations is too di¤erent between each other. Consequently, while the similarity of the conclusions is quite unexpected, it also makes them more reliable. Moreover, since monthly outputs have a low correlation between each other, the con ‡icting patterns between models that one could foresee turned out to be false. # obs. 18 18 54 54
0:477 0:905 0:771 0:817 (*),(**),(***) signi…cant at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. Standard deviations are in brackets. Estimated by GMM:
;q ] + " t . GDP: Gross domestic product; GWh: Consumption of electric power in GWh. Instruments include: lags 1 to 4 of interest rate, in ‡ation, exchange rate variation, reserves variation, and output gap.
Few observations lead to a strong bias towards not rejecting the null, if we take into account the high standard deviations in Table 2 . For that reason, any rejection, consistent of course with other checks, should be stressed. The in ‡ation target parameter is considerably di¤erent across output proxies. Arguably, that re ‡ects some sort of adjustment in the monetary policy under controlled in ‡ation, possibly with e¤ects on the low g i too. In fact, the smooth parameter g i is low in all models. The pattern is similar even considering the di¤erence between the number of observations.
The coe¢ cients g x are negative with quarterly data and positive with monthly data, and all of them decreased in size compared to the preceding sample, accompanying the interest rate level trend. Again, output gap with the quarterly sample indicates recession, rather than expansion as with the monthly sample (see Figure 6 in Appendix B). For that reason, the sign of g x with quarterly data is negative, as though the policymaker were reinforcing the control over in ‡ation.
The in ‡ation parameter g is less than one in magnitude across output proxies.
Wald tests heavily con…rm the claim statistically. They are quite similar around 0:7, except for the model with quarterly GDP, although still inferior to one.
If one believes in ‡ation was controlled, even partly, then according to the Taylor rule predictions, the parameter g should increase compared to the previous sample.
However, what happens is quite the contrary, indeed. Hence, an in ‡ation parameter less than one does not necessarily characterize an unstable in ‡ation.
In previous versions of this article, I included reserves growth and exchange rate variations as explanatory variables, following Ball (1999) and Salgado et alli (2005).
The new parameters turned out to be negligible in size and signi…cance. Summing them up with g yields a number still inferior to one. I also proceeded with another unreported robustness check by setting (k; q) = (0; 0). The picture is exactly the same as analyzed in this section.
In ‡ation Target Era
This section serves to compare the outcomes of this paper with other studies that use Brazilian data, and to confront them with what we have seen in previous sections. For that purpose, I discuss two possible rule speci…cations that describe the monetary policy in Brazil equally well.
To begin with, the exchange rate became ‡oating in 1999, and the Brazilian central bank announced they would pursue a target for in ‡ation for the next twelve months. That year constituted a transition period and expected in ‡ation data were still unavailable publicly. Thereby, to avoid contaminating data either during the Real Era or during the In ‡ation Target Era, I keep them out of the sample.
In view of this explicit change in the monetary policy, I estimated the Taylor rule by taking the expectations forward one year 21 , but the in ‡ation coe¢ cient g became too low, sometimes nonsigni…cant 22 . The coe¢ cient g i is aproximately 0:6:
For that reason, I have skipped the tables, relegating them to Appendix E.1, and preferred to discuss other possible speci…cations that describe what happened more accurately.
The …rst alternative is to approach the rule by using current in ‡ation, that is, setting (k; q) = (0; 0). Under this hypothesis, Table 5 provides the estimated parameters.
First, the real interest rate during this period falls to 9:6%. Second, the in ‡a-tion target parameter becomes considerably similar across output proxies and is consistent with the average in ‡ation target announced by Copom along the years.
As expected, we see a sharp reduction in the parameter , mainly compared with Table 4 in the previous section.
The output gap coe¢ cients g x are, in general, nonsigni…cant and low in size.
By contrast, the lagged interest rate parameters g i are high and signi…cant, with a coe¢ cient that is more similar to what is described in the literature.
In general, the in ‡ation parameter g is around 0:5, similarly to what we saw in 21 I also did estimate the model setting (k; q) = (1; 1). It presented a performance as good as setting one year forward. The results are not reported, but there is a discussion about them in Appendix E.1. 22 The other coe¢ cients were reasonable and, in general, close to the other speci…cations that I discuss within this section. # obs. 27 27 83 83
Do not reject Reject , g < 1 Reject , g < 1 Reject , g < 1 Prob J-test.
0:946 0:937 0:074 0:045 (*),(**),(***) signi…cant at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. Standard-deviations are in brackets. Estimated by GMM:
Gross domestic product; GWh: Consumption of electric power in GWh. Instruments include: lags 1 to 4 of interest rate, in ‡ation, exchange rate variation, reserves variation, output gap, and 1 lag in ‡ation target deviation.
the last section. The greater-than-one in ‡ation coe¢ cient using quarterly GDP is highly volatile and comes from a model with too few observations, therefore it should be read with care. In fact, all other models I have estimated present a coe¢ cient g < 1, as con…rmed by Table 14 in Appendix E.2. As a consequence, there is still monetary stability associated with an in ‡ation coe¢ cient inferior to one. Moreover, the other models in the Appendix are not rejected according to the J-test.
Some researchers may argue that the in ‡ation coe¢ cient is less than one because the central bank responds to deviations of in ‡ation from the in ‡ation target instead of to current or expected in ‡ation alone. Moreover, since expected in ‡ation is observable, and in ‡ation target is announced in advance, those variables should be explicit in the Taylor rule. Thereby, instead of using equation (3), I estimate equation (4), which is repeated for convenience as follows:
As already discussed, the expectations refer to in ‡ation in the next twelve months.
Therefore, it is fair to set expectations forward one year, that is, (k; q) = (12; 1) for monthly data and (k; q) = (4; 1) for quarterly data, according to the adjustments described in Section 3. 
k + g x x t;q g + " t . GDP: Gross domestic product; GWh: Consumption of electric power in GWh. Instruments include: lags 1 to 4 of interest rate, in ‡ation, exchange rate variation, reserves variation, output gap, and 1 lag in ‡ation target deviation.
The numbers in Table 6 are similar to those obtained by Minella et alli (2002 Minella et alli ( , 2003 and Favero and Giavazzi (2002) , especially the in ‡ation parameter g and 23 . The coe¢ cients g x are all negative, whereas they are statistically signi…cant only with quarterly data. The sign is consistent with Minella et alli (2002) , but the magnitude is di¤erent. However, the big picture remains.
Not only does the smooth parameter g i have the expected sign across output proxies, having returned to the size observed in the literature and in the Megain ‡ationary Era, but also g x and are close to the …gures in the previous table.
We see that the in ‡ation parameter for quarterly GDP is now less than one. But the estimate is not much reliable because of the small number of observations. By contrast, the others are greater than one, but Wald tests indicate that we cannot reject that they are equal to one. Such conclusion is somewhat unexpected, because with stable in ‡ation, we should …nd g > 1 as did Clarida, Galí and Gertler (2000) regarding the U.S.
Thus far, the models discussed in this section are equally plausible descriptions of the recent monetary policy in Brazil. In fact, if one adapted the R 2 as a measure of goodness-of-…t, then one would conclude they are practically identical, with a very tiny advantage of using the rule with in ‡ation deviations. For example, in the rule with contemporaneous in ‡ation, quadratic detrend of GWh, and monthly data, the R 2 is 0:544; the rule based on in ‡ation target deviations, with the same detrend method and frequency, presents 24 an R 2 = 0:549. Consequently, we see again stable in ‡ation associated with a loose monetary policy.
If both rules describe the monetary policy equally well, why is this so? It is beyond the scope of this paper to go further and answer that question, but perhaps a clue may help. Figure 5 suggests that current in ‡ation and expected in ‡ation target deviations are the two sides of the same coin, since they share similar tendencies at 23 You must add the r to to …nd their constant. 24 The models based upon one period or one year forward present an R 2 on average equal to 0:4: di¤erent absolute levels. In fact, the correlation between the series is 0:6 _ 5. Furthermore, Granger tests indicate causality in either direction. That deviations should cause current in ‡a-tion is somewhat intuitive by expectational Phillips curve arguments. However, the causality in the other direction is unexpected. Whatever the answer is, we remain in a rule where we have observed g < 1 under stable monetary regimes.
Conclusions
This paper has characterized the monetary policy in Brazil using the Taylor rule through a forward-looking Taylor-rule-type reaction function before and after the Real plan. Table 7 provides a picture of the outcomes in terms of Wald tests, using all output gap schemes and alternative rules. 
,(**),(***) signi…cant at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. GDP: Gross domestic product; GWh: Total consumption of electric power in GWh, IND: Industrial production index, NR: not rejected, U: unfeasible. Forward refers to the model in which (k; q) = (1; 1). Current refers to the model in which (k; q) = (0; 0), however the conclusion is the same if we set either (k; q) = (1; 1) or take expectations forward one year. Deviation refers to the model in which the explanatory variable is the observed expected in ‡ation target deviation.
The table makes it clear that the in ‡ation coe¢ cient g was greater than one before stabilization and smaller than that afterwards, despite the existence of price indeterminacy in Brazil before the Real plan. During the In ‡ation Target Era, the coe¢ cients are not statistically di¤erent from one even using a model where in ‡ation deviation from the target is the explanatory variable. It is quite unexpected that the qualitative conclusions and the magnitudes of the numbers could be considerably homogeneous across di¤erent proxies for output, output gap and data frequency.
This is particularly true when we remind ourselves how di¤erent the output gaps can be depending on the potential output speci…cation, and how low the correlations between outputs with monthly data are.
From these …ndings, …rst, one can say that an interest rate response to in ‡ation greater than one-to-one may not characterize monetary determinacy. Second, an interest rate response to in ‡ation smaller than one-to-one may not characterize monetary indeterminacy. The …rst and second conclusions invert the Taylor's principle and challenge conventional wisdom as regards the rule.
Third, since g > 1 during the Megain ‡ationary Era, monetary policymakers were active trying to keep in ‡ation down, but failed or, at most, were able to hold prices up in order to avoid a hyperin ‡ation. Moreover, the in ‡ation coe¢ cient signi…cance in a forward-looking reaction function reveals that policymakers were in fact looking at least one period ahead to set up the interest rate. That is, monetary authorities
were not passive against in ‡ation and did not look back as many people still believe.
It seems clear that it is necessary to look for a model which could explain the behavior encountered in this paper. With regard to the question raised in the title, the Taylor rule did not stabilize in ‡ation in Brazil and has not held it stable.
Appendix B: Di¤erences in Monthly Output Gap Using GWh Here, both linear and quadratic gaps are quite reasonable. They indicate alternate periods of expansion and recession. Notwithstanding, the linear potential output has remained above quadratic potential output after the power shortage in 2001.
Appendix C: Robustness Check for the Megain ‡a-tionary Era section with other Ouptput Gaps
The reaction function estimated here is: i t = g i i t 1 + (1 g i ) [(r (g 1) ) + g t;k + g x x t;q ] + " t ;
where " t = t (1 g i ) fg [ t;k E t ( t;k )] + g x [x t;q E t (x t;q )]g . Table 10 reinforces the results discussed in the main body of the paper, except for the fact that g for the GDP is nonsigni…cant, although very high in size. Monthly data seem to show a higher , but the other conclusions remain. Reject , g > 1 Do not reject Reject , g > 1 Do not reject Prob J-test. 0:573 0:818 0:883 0:833 (*),(**),(***) signi…cant at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. Standard-deviations are in brackets. Estimated by GMM: i t = g i i t 1 + (1 g i ) [(r (g 1) ) + g t;k + g x x t;q ] + " t . GDP: Gross domestic product; GWh: Consumption of electric power in GWh; IND: Industrial production index. Instruments include: lags 1 to 4 of interest rate, in ‡ation, exchange rate variation, reserves variation, and output gap.
Appendix D: Robustness Check for the Real Era section with other Ouptput Gaps
where " t = t (1 g i ) fg [ t;k E t ( t;k )] + g x [x t;q E t (x t;q )]g . Table 11 reinforces the results discussed in the main body of the paper, except for the fact that g for the IND is greater than one, although not statistically di¤erent from 1. Results for quarterly GWh seem weird, probably because of the low number of observations. Reject , g < 1 Reject , g < 1 Do not reject Prob J-test. 0:861 0:730 0:906 (*),(**),(***) signi…cant at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. Standard deviations are in brackets. Estimated by GMM: i t = g i i t 1 + (1 g i ) [(r (g 1) ) + g t;k + g x x t;q ] + " t . GDP: Gross Domestic Product; GWh: Consumption of electric power in GWh; IND: Industrial Production Index. Instruments include: lags 1 to 4 of interest rate, in ‡ation, exchange rate variation, reserves variation, and output gap.
In other estimations, not reported in this paper but available from the author upon request, I estimate the model setting (k; q) = (1; 1) as in the other subsamples. There are some di¤erences. The parameter g is low, signi…cant and positive for quarterly data. By contrast, it is always negative and nonsigni…cant for monthly data. The parameter g i is similar to literature. 
